T his study explores the many facets of hazard communication programs that affect information disclosure throughout the organization, in particular dissemination of information to health providers. Twenty-four nurses at 22 different industrial sites were queried about the extent of hazard information sharing in the workplace, specifically in relation to their involvement in and perception of the process.
The hazard communication process was studied from the perspective of the occupational health nurse because of the implications for employee access to risk information. If the nurse, who sees the employee for health care and health education, is not collecting and disseminating the hazard information described in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Hazard Communication Rule [29 CFR 1910 .1200 , then employee health problems that arise from work exposures may go undetected at clinic visits. Furthermore, both the employee and the nurse may lack adequate understanding about the use of personal protective equipment or careful work practices to prevent work related illness and injury.
The Hazard Communication Rule heralded a new direction in regulatory policy for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The Hazard Communica-
The manner in which hazard information was exchanged varied from company to company regardless of whether the plant was union or nonunion.
tion Rule (herein referred to as Haz Com) specifies a global approach to chemical risk management. The Rule mandates the transfer of chemical risk information from manufacturers, importers and suppliers to employers who in turn notify workers. In this way, both employers and workers can evaluate chemical exposures and can identify the appropriate controls for these exposures. Haz Com requires employers to train employees about chemical hazards and to label substances in the workplace. In addition, employers must keep and make available, at employee request, Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) explaining chemical risks and their control.
INFORMATION ACCESS
Whether Haz Com enables work-ers to perform risk analysis or recognize and avoid hazards may depend largely on the accessibility of information. Access can be restricted in a number of ways. For example, the package of information in overly vague or overly technical language limits information disclosure. Karstadt (1988) has documented problems with the quality of certain MSDS in terms of the unclear language.
Another way access can be restricted is through poorly defined Haz Com responsibilities within the company. This problem is more serious than the problem with any given MSDS because the effects are so pervasive. Poor policy may reflect a lack of management commitment to hazard communication and, in fact, management commitment has been noted to affect the success of hazard training programs (Sanrodonato, 1981) .
Even well-intentioned companies may advance policies ill-equipped to handle the complexities of hazard information sharing among the necessary parties. The process of hazard communication is complicated by the serial transmission of information through a channel of actors, from chemical manufacturers to managers, to health and safety professionals, and finally to workers.
Even though the effectiveness of Haz Com is ultimately evidenced by workers' increased knowledge and avoidance of risks, measuring knowledge is problematic. Workers mayor may not accrue knowledge for reasons other than Haz Com programs. Worker knowledge may be influenced by variables such as individual experience, motivation, or ability. Some studies evaluating worker knowledge of risks have documented Haz Com problems regardless of these limitations (Friedman, 1987) .
Haz Com effectiveness can be understated if only outcome measures such as worker knowledge are studied. The Rule may be successful in creating a continual process for information exchange, regardless of when worker knowledge becomes affected. Thus, examining the process of hazard communication has merit.
To study this process, the vantage point of the nurse was selected, since the nurse is a necessary link in the hazard communication chain. If Haz Com is to prevent work related illness and injury through the sharing of risk information, then information sharing must pervade the organization, at least to the extent that health risk information is shared by providers.
Presumably, if health professionals are not accessing and using hazard data, employees in turn will be disadvantaged. If health professionals remain outside the loop for hazard information, then the goal of the Haz Com Rule to address worker health is potentially unfulfilled.
METHODS
The purpose of this study was to explore the many facets of Haz Com programs that affect the dissemination of hazard information in the organization, in particular, dissemination of information to health providers. The theoretical approach to understanding these programs was to analyze seven subject areas assumed to have some bearing on the process of hazard communication: organizational characteristics; nurse characteristics; nurse knowledge about the Nursing education, experience, and certification seemed to make no difference in nursing knowledge about hazardous chemicals or work processes.
Haz Com program; nurse involvement in the Haz Com program; nursing practice; nurse knowledge of chemical hazards at work; and outcomes of Haz Com programs. These seven domains are detailed in the Table. This study did not include statistical analyses, as this study is more a qualitative study than a quantitative one.
To explore the areas of interest, 24 nurses agreed to a 30 minute telephone interview that addressed company health and safety policies and practices, particularly in relation to Haz Com programs. In addition to the telephone interview, participants agreed to complete a one page mailed data form, which collected basic statistics about the nurse and the company. Even though only 17 of the statistical forms were returned, telephone follow up was successful in collecting some of the missing information.
The mailed survey also requested position descriptions, written Haz Com programs, and organizational charts. These additional items, when submitted, helped to verify company expectations for the nurse and detail elements of company health and Haz Com programs. Many nurses reported that the written Haz Com programs were too lengthy to reproduce and that position descriptions were unavailable.
Together, the telephone interview and the written survey questions probed each of the seven subject areas mentioned previously. The specific questions are discussed in the following section.
Fifty participants were selected at random from the American Association of Occupational Health Nurses (AAOHN) membership list of nurses in the chemical industry in the hope of obtaining a sample size of 2S participants. This sample size was consistent with the time and resources available for the study. Twenty-four nurses met the incl~ sion criteria: reachable by telephone and responsible for clinical duties. Only one nurse declined to participate.
The AAOHN list excludes both companies that do not have a nurse and those that have nurses who are not members of the organization.
In the first exclusion, companies that do not employ a nurse, observing the transfer of information through health services was obviously inappropriate. The examination of this population would be helpful in understanding the broader question of hazard information disclosure across the entire organization, not only with respect to the nurse. However, this more general inquiry is not the focus of this study.
In the second exclusion (companies with nurses who are not AAOHN members), nurses in the professional organization were assumed to be more aware of Haz Com because of MOHN's efforts to educate its constituency regardless of any information access issues at their worksites. If this group of nurses are not using hazard information, constraints on information access are potentially more serious.
For the sake of uniformity only the chemical industry was studied, since different production processes would make chemical hazards more or less evident in the workplace and create different challenges to information access. The importance of hazard information transfer in this trade is appreciated in the quantity of substances used and the potential for exposure.
The randomized sample included nurses from the same company, al-though not necessarily from the same site; however, two sites did have two nurses represented. A total of four companies had multiple representation; two companies had three nurses each and two had two nurses each. This unplanned redundancy provided a great opportunity to verify the nature of company health and safety programs and to validate the observed effects of an organization's structuring of the hazard communication process on nursing knowledge of chemical hazards.
MAJOR FINDINGS

Organizational Characteristics
Companies ranged in size from 119 to 27,000 employees. Small companies were defined as having fewer than 1,000 employees, since this figure seemed to be the cutoff point for companies to operate larger than one nurse health units. Twelve companies were operationally defined as small in this study.
Companies having between 1,000 and 5,000 employees were defined as medium size; six sites fit this description. Six cases were categorized as large operations or companies, ranging in size from 7,500 to 27,000 employees. In this category, two companies and two sites for each company were represented in the sample. Looking at the total sample, 25% of the cases came from large companies, 25% were medium size, and 50% were small companies.
In general, the size of the company did have some bearing on how much the nurse knew about Haz Com programs, and ultimately how much the nurse knew about chemicals and work processes. Seven of 12 nurses in small size companies were knowledgeable about chemical risks compared to two of six nurses in medium size companies and three of the six nurses in large companies.
The nurses in small companies were better informed as a group. This may reflect the more specialized production processes and centralized training programs at these smaller plants. It also seems true that the larger the number of health and safety professionals in the company, the more health and safety functions 
Outcomes of Haz Com
Workplace changes after the Rule: substitution policies, increased awareness, use of personal protective equipment, change in work conditions Injury/illness statistics OSHA compliance data were specialized and the less nurses knew about the role of safety and industrial hygiene, especially in regard to Haz Com. In other words, health and safety efforts were seemingly not well integrated when more health and safety professionals were involved.
In the largest company, however, even with a large health and safety force, the nurses were better informed when compared with other large and medium size companies. Perhaps because nurses in this company had computer access to company health and safety reports via their own terminals, information was shared more readily.
Forty-one percent of the companies were unionized. The manner in which hazard information was exchanged varied among companies, regardless of whether the plant was union or non-union. Ninety-six percent of the sites had some form of health and safety committee, with some companies having employee representation and others having none. Employee representation, either through unions or through health and safety committees, seemed irrelevant to the role of the health professional in Haz Com. Likewise, health providers' knowledge about chemical exposures appeared unaffected by whether the plant was unionized.
Companies emphasized safety aspects in Haz Com either when personnel resources favored safety over health, or health and safety staff reported to different divisions in the organization, or health personnel reported to safety departments. These programs focused on physical hazards of chemicals and procedural requirements for employee notification of hazards. Moreover, safety was emphasized for most of the sample (21 of 24) as evidenced by Haz Com policies designating safety personnel responsible for Haz Com, with little or no input from health providers. In general, nursing job descriptions and written Haz Com programs did not specify any nursing responsibility for Haz Com.
When hazard communication was perceived as part of their jobs, nurses were more knowledgeable about chemical exposures.
For the many companies that divided the reporting of health and safety in the organizational structure, health and safety programs seemingly were not well integrated. Consequently, nurses in these organizations were not knowledgeable about the Haz Com program, chemical hazards, or work exposures. The separateness of these health and safety programs may have more to do with the different and sometimes competing orientations of health and safety professionals toward occupational problems, since the distinction in health and safety roles was clear to the respondents.
Safety departments, directing worker protection programs, evaluated environmental hazards that placed workers at risk. In this context, industrial hygiene functions either were carried out by safety, or industrial hygiene professionals performed sampling in support of safety professionals' responsibility to monitor the environment. Industrial hygiene was aligned philosophically, if not organizationally, with safety professionals and not with health providers.
Health departments, directing health promotion programs, examined individual worker health problems that affected employees' general functioning at work. Because of the sharp distinction between professional roles and the lack of coordinated efforts, looking at environmental exposures and health problems that resulted from work exposures received little company attention.
Regardless of individual variances among production sites and nurses, policies or procedures that sharply define the limits of health and safety functions affect the ability of the organization to transfer hazard information through nurses. The responses of groups of nurses from the same company were especially enlightening. Interestingly, nurses in the same company responded similarly to knowledge questions about chemicals, work processes, and perceptions of Haz Com. Their knowledge was similar despite differences in experience or education and despite the fact that some of these nurses were operating out of different sites and across state lines.
In summary, the nurses' knowledge of chemicals in the workplace seemed to be affected by the organizational climate for health and safety, the perceived importance of workplace health in relation to workplace safety, and the specialization of health and safety functions due to company size and structure, or differences in professional ideologies.
Nurse Characteristics
Nursing education and experience was varied for the participants: 43% (n = 10) of the nurses had a diploma in nursing; 22% (n = 5) had an associate degree in nursing; and 26% (n = 6) had a baccalaureate degree. Two nurses had master's preparation. One nurse's educational preparation information was not obtained. All but two of the nurses had moderate to heavy experience (more than 5 years) in occupational health. Eighteen (75%) of the 24 nurses had been in their current jobs more than 5 years. Four (17%) of the nurses were certified in occupational health nursmg.
Nursing education, experience, and certification seemed to have no bearing on how much the nurse knew about hazardous chemicals or work processes with one exception: nurses in small, one nurse operations who were fairly new to the position (less than 3 years). These nurses had acquired greater knowledge than nurses with similar experience in larger operations and nurses with considerable experience in smaller operations. New nurses in one nurse units had more knowledge despite other circumstances in the organiza-: tion that appeared to mitigate the sharing of hazard information with health providers (see section on organizational characteristics). Perhaps these new nurses had not been socialized yet into the organizational role for health care providers.
Nursing Involvement
and Knowledge Without question, the more involved nurses were in the elements of hazard communication, training, hazard identification, and MSDS collection and review, the more they knew about the company's program and about the hazardous substances and work processes at the facility. But for the most part, nurses did not participate in Haz Com programs. Only three nurses were involved in the formal training of employees. Only half of the group ever attended the company's orientation to Haz Com. As a result, 29% (n = 7) were unsure what content was covered in employee training or when employees underwent training. Twenty-one percent of the nurses (n = 5) were unsure how employees accessed MSDS.
When asked to name three hazardous substances in the nurse's facility, 43% (n = 10) were unable to name them, and in a few cases the nurse was unable to name two substances. Thirty-nine percent (n = 9) of the respondents gave incomplete or inaccurate information about the health effects of the chemicals they named, and 39% (n = 9) did not know where in the production process the chemicals cited were used. In addition, 30% (n = 7) of the nurses were not sure what controls were used for the exposures in question. One nurse declined to answer questions about chemicals.
Experience or education seemed to have little bearing on how knowl-If health professionals are not accessing and utilizing hazard data, then employees will be at a disadvantage.
edgeable the respondents were about hazardous substances. The more notable influences on knowledge were how the organization structured the nurses' jobs and how the nurses perceived their functioning within that organization.
Nursing Practice Practice questions covered two topics: how information flowed through health services; and role expectations. Nurses were askedabout their role in Haz Com, worksite evaluations, medical (health) surveillance activities, and health and safety committees, and about how they used chemical information sources. They were asked about workers' expectations of health services and about problems with information exchange within the company.
Sixteen of the nurses (67%) did not participate in the health and safety committee. Only about half of the companies had any nursing representation on these committees. Most of the respondents did not perceive any problems with information exchange between health and other departments in their companies; yet, many of the nurses were unclear about the role of safety in hazard communication, the specific activities of the health and safety committee, or the information employees received about hazards.
Three of the nurses noted a problem in their interactions with safety professionals, commenting: "I had to work hard to get a position on the safety committee"; "safety doesn't McNeely think to consult me"; "safety clearly is the priority here, less focus on health problems."
Of those nurses citing problems with information exchange, nine nurses (37.5%) remarked that communication with management was less than optimal either because management was difficult to access, resistant to disseminate some of the health warnings for chemicals, or "invisible" from health services. One nurse commented, "management doesn't think to consult me." Nurses noting problems in communicating with management were also less informed about chemical hazards and work processes.
One would expect nurses participating in health and safety committees to know more about chemical hazards at work. Interestingly, this was not the case. Those nurses who sat on committees were not those most knowledgeable about chemical hazards. This may be explained partly by the apparent focus on safety matters and not health concerns in these committees. In fact, some of these committees were referred to as the "safety" committee.
Half of the nurses did not perform worksite tours, except rarely. Some of the nurses commented: "It's like an emergency room here, I'm too busy to get out on the floor." or "I'm not out there to know what's going on." Yet, nurses were the ones responding to employee health problems. Every interviewee commented that the nurse was likely to be the first person to evaluate employee health problems.
Thirteen nurses (54%) were explicit that hazard communication was a "safety" issue and not a health program in relating their perceptions of Haz Com programs. These comments were made: "Perhaps you should talk to safety about hazard communication, I can't really tell you anything." "Safety and industrial hygiene can tell you about proper work practices and appropriate use of personal protective equipment, I just do acute care." "Medical unit looks at general health while safety looks at chemicals." "RNs take care of health topics, training is safety oriented."
When nurses perceived hazard communication as part of their job, they were more knowledgeable about chemical exposures, but these perceptions usually coincided with the organization's expectations of health services. One nurse was knowledgeable about chemical exposures because she saw hazard communication as part of her job, although technically this was out of her job description. She commented, "RNs sneak in as much teaching about health effects of chemicals on a one-to-one basis as they can since the Haz Com training is mostly safety oriented." Of interest is the choice of words in her response, implying that this was not a valid role for health services.
Three nurses (12.5%) were informed about chemical hazards even though they did not see Haz Com as part of their role, and neither did their company considering policies and procedures defining the extent of nursing involvement. For all of these nurses, the position was relatively new and the company was small. It may be true that organizational role definitions had not yet affected the scope of nursing practice for these new nurses. To reiterate an earlier point, the scope of nursing practice varied more by organizational expectations than by the nurse's educational preparation. For these three nurses, two had an associate degree and one had a diploma.
Outcomes of Haz Com Efforts
Most of the nurses thought Haz Com raised awareness about chemicals in management, health and safety professionals, and employees, yet most of the nurses did not see any behavior changes at the worksite because of the policy. Many suggested that the company had a "good" health and safety program before Haz Com in terms of substitution policies, workplace conditions, availability of personal protective equipment, and employee notification.
To investigate the success of various Haz Com programs in the prevention of occupational problems, injury and illness data were requested. However, most participants could not provide data. When submitted, injury and illness statistics were not always differentiated. Additionally, companies did not report incidence rates. Therefore, the data could not be compared with Bureau of Labor Statistics data, and program success was indeterminate.
Another means to evaluate the overall health and safety profile of the company was to examine OSHA compliance data. The availability of OSHA data was contingent on whether the sites had been visited since the promulgation of the Haz Com Rule. Coincidentally, 11 of the sites had been inspected but most of the inspection reports did not include the calculation of injury and illness rates. In addition, Haz Com violations did not corroborate any of the descriptive reports about the programs by the nurses. So, too, when deficiencies in the hazard communication were noted by the nurse, the inspection failed to uncover the problems.
Two fatal accidents occurred at companies in the sample; one was an explosion and the other was a forklift accident. Both of these companies had no citations for deficiencies in their hazard communication program.
In summary, injury and illness statistics were not a helpful check on whether the involvement and knowledge of health care providers had any influence on the ultimate success of hazard communication. Of interest, most of the nurses perceived no difference in workplace behaviors because of the Rule, and for most the establishment of Haz Com programs did little to affect their responsibilities. This lack of behavioral responsiveness to the Rule does not bode well for changing the course of occupational health problems as intended.
DISCUSSION
Corporate policies influence Haz
Com programming through company definitions of the actors, the program, and the process of information exchange. Different policies have implications for how pervasive hazard communication is in the organization and how knowledgeable health professionals are about chemicals at work.
In this study, nurses had only a moderate understanding of hazard information. Attitudes that emphasized safety and injury prevention and minimized preventive health in relation to work exposures, conditioned nurses' need to know about chemicals and subsequently affected their acquired knowledge. For the most part, preventive health in the workplace tended toward modifying individual employee lifestyle risks or general employee health screening rather than employee exposure surveillance.
Safety and industrial hygiene programs focused on monitoring the environment and on compliance activities. Minimal overlap existed between these programs. The significance of this problem is that the promise of Haz Com to identify, evaluate, and communicate chemical health effects in workers is potentially unfulfilled when Haz Com is operationalized as a safety program and not as a health program.
Historically in both the public and private sectors, occupational health and safety efforts have focused on safety. In the public sector, the safety emphasis overshadows health provider activities and industrial hygiene activities as well. (At OSHA, industrial hygiene is intrinsically a health program). OSHA has been criticized in early years and more recently for emphasizing safety and slighting health standards and health inspections (Ashford, 1976; Noble, 1987; Thompson, 1987) . Safety inspections still exceed health inspections almost two to one (OSHA-MDSA, 1989 ). OSHA's response to this lack of parity has been to point to the amount of time and resources that health inspections demand over safety (Occupational Hazards' OSHA Communique, 1987 ). Yet this response may reflect an absence of clear policy initiatives to shift the focus to health.
On the private side, industry also seems to have followed a tradition of investing in safety over health. Policy analysts have discussed the system incentives for industry to assume this posture.
One incentive for employers to highlight safety is that their costs are more readily affected by accident and injury rates versus occupational disease rates. The relationship to work is much harder to establish for disease than for injury, given the present workers' compensation system.
Second, since onset of occupational disease typically involves a latency period, company investment today in prevention is costly. The return on an investment would be discounted over the 10 or 20 years a disease would lie dormant. A case for a "wait and see" or "pay later" approach could be rationalized. The lack of scientific evidence specifying the degree of health risk further complicates cost-benefit calculations and sometimes exaggerates the expense of disease prevention.
Third, because safety problems are more obvious to managers and employees, employers may be motivated to deal with these problems as a priority to avoid paying wage differentials or hazard premiums to workers (Viscusi, 1983) . Last, since OSHA paved the way for compliance duties to be directed toward safety at the inception of the agency (and some would argue this is still true today), industry activities have followed suit.
A study of the effect of OSHA on the chemical industry noted: "The result [sic: of OSHA regulation] has been to focus far greater attention and effort on identifying safety hazards and OSHA safety violations than on identifying health hazards" (Northrup, 1978) . Furthermore, industry specialists argue that compa-nies that pursue prevention activities outside the regulatory priorities face risks and assume costs not shared by most firms that are solely interested in meeting the letter of the law (Northrup, 1978) .
The early priority of safety in the regulatory agenda increased the activities of corporate safety units and raised the influence and status of safety personnel throughout the organization (Northrup, 1978) . In this study, many safety departments were given a more dominant position over health in the organization. Subsequently, the organizational philosophy of occupational health and safety was ideologically based in a safety orientation. The approach was one of injury prevention.
Given the deeply ingrained attitudes about occupational health and safety, can Haz Com as a performance based rule effectively change attitudes and knowledge about chemicals in the workplace? Performance standards specify outcome criteria without specifying the particular means to achieve these goals.
This format allows more employer discretion to meet the intent of the standard any number of ways, given employer preferences and resources. The format is appealing one, especially for a generic standard that has far reaching effects in the workplace, and covers numerous substances. However, the format assures different levels of goal achievement, given uneven resources and multiple interpretations of the Rule within any company.
In view of the incentives in the system to prioritize safety over health, can a Rule designed to counter that effect attain this end when formatted as such an open ended policy? The challenge will be to change attitudes and incentives before the program in its present form is accepted as a health program and addresses the health needs of workers.
The vision of Haz Com is more than access to information; it encompasses the duty to inform workers. This distinction is important for
McNeely two reasons. First, workers are not likely to access information if they do not perceive they are at risk (Brown, 1984) . Secondly, informing workers about risks, employee training, is influenced by the trainer's perception of risk. This is of concern since the trainer's frame of reference is shaped by professional ideologies and institutional incentives, the latter giving way to market forces. No wonder methods, frequency, and content of Haz Com programs vary greatly.
In view of the numerous factors that affect employer perception of risk, there is good cause to look at how information is communicated. Since perceptions of employers and employees are continually challenged by new information and larger socioeconomic forces, hazard communication cannot be a one step process. Worker education must be continuous and must pervade the workplace to effectively address risks.
In this model of hazard communication, health providers would discuss chemical risks at health visits. To achieve this level of training and interaction, attitudes about addressing health risks need to be changed so that health hazard information is not only available but well communicated to all those with a need to know. Haz Com needs to be viewed not as a separate subprogram in an organization's health and safety program, but embraced as a way of thinking about hazards in the larger organizational picture. This global approach would more aptly reflect the goal of a generic standard.
Whether Haz Com information has reached the individuals most affected (the workers) is contentious without drawing some connection between the pervasiveness of hazard information sharing in the organization and workers' knowledge. The point of this investigation was to look at the organizational structures that support an ongoing process for hazard evaluation and risk communication. The finding that health providers are not integral to this process is disconcerting, since their charge is to discover employees at risk. Of more concern is that discovery, for the most part, was a passive process contingent on the employee's perception that symptoms were work related.
Many of the nurses reportedly investigated a chemical only when employees thought they had an exposure. The employee's perception, as the point of departure for diagnosis, can be dangerously misleading, considering that even health providers have a difficult time because occupational and nonoccupational diseases present similarly.
Discussions with some nurses revealed that employees were logged into the health unit as either an occupational or nonoccupational visit before they were evaluated. Not surprisingly, occupational disease is suspected to be grossly under reported in industry (Office of Technology Assessment, 1985) .
Many nurses in the study assumed a more passive role in risk identification and communication because of policies and procedures reflecting a larger organizational approach to worker health problems. Here again is a missed opportunity for Haz Com effectively to have an impact on the incidence and prevalence of occupational disease.
Since perceptions of risk affect an employee's willingness to seek information, employers and health and safety professionals need to realize the shortcomings of Haz Com programs dedicated primarily to making information available, as opposed to actively providing instruction. Employees' perceptions of risk, not unlike the employers' perceptions of risk, are influenced by many factors (Brown, 1984; Nelkin, 1984) .
Apart from the ubiquitous dimensions of risk perception (not discussed here), certain characteristics of the chemical industry have their own peculiar influence on risk perception. First, the character of the chemical industry is such that a majority of the processes are enclosed with continuous product flow of raw materials through blending and reaction processes to product packaging (Northrup, 1978) . Many of the jobs involve monitoring these production processes at a distance and involve no contact with substances. This situation makes the job deceptively nonhazardous since maintenance, cleaning, and testing operations, which have the potential for exposures, still occur on the job.
The industry employs a fair number of long time workers as reported by the interviewees and elsewhere (Northrup, 1978) . Perception of risk is dulled in these workers since the appreciation of risk is sharper in the presence of new hazards (Brown, 1984) .
In this study, nurses new to the workplace were more knowledgeable about chemical risks. One would assume the same holds true for new workers, but most workers in the chemical industry are not new. Since the hazards of the chemical industry may appear removed (enclosed processes) and workers are long term employees, Haz Com training must be rigorous to change attitudes, knowledge, and behavior in relation to chemicals.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In lieu of other good incentives in the system for employers to proactively and rigorously inform workers about health hazards, four policy initiatives are recommended. • OSHA may need to be more specific about the process of hazard communication. Perhaps hazard communication should be in part a criteriabased rule. • A more general approach for OSHA would be to launch an educational campaign for employers and health and safety professionals to shift their focus to health in the acceptance of Haz Com. The effectiveness of this campaign would be enhanced by involvement of professional organizations such as AAOHN in promoting a broader vision of occupational health. • OSHA needs to be clear about its policy initiatives, eg, direct more attention to health warnings on MSDS, provide clearer guidelines on the reporting of occupational illness, and conduct a greater number of health inspections. • OSHA's separation of health and safety inspections sets a model of practice for industry that suggests a distinction between health and safety efforts and compounds the problem of a lack of integrated functioning in these two areas. OSHA can help employers and health and safety professionals understand the integrated functions of health and safety by demonstrating greater overlap in health and safety standards, inspections, and educational programs.
The sample used in this study was taken at random from occupational health nurses in the chemical industry only. To further evaluate the processes and problems noted in this study, a larger sample size and more generalized questions are suggested.
